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inflation rates have risen around the woiid over
the last 20 years the impact of inflation has become a
topic of widespread interest, Evidence suggests that
higher inflation imposes real costs on society by lead-
ing toincreased uncertainty about futur-e inflation and,
as a result, a misallocation of resources,’ This article
examines the impact of inflation uncertainty on the
allocation oflabor resources and shows that theecon-
omy produces less output with a given quanti~ of
productive resources when inflation uncertainty is
higher.2
LABOR MARKET RESPONSE TO
UNANTICIPATED INFLATION
The labor market’s reaction to unanticipated infla-
tion depends upon the flexibility of nominal wages. As
ageneral rule, both the quantity of labor services that
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Louis, Jude L. Naes, Jr. provided research assistance. The author
wishesto thank Daniel Hamermesh tot comments on an earlier draft
‘For a discussion of the relationship between inflation and inflation
uncertainty, see Holland (1984). The best-known discussion of the
potential adverse impacts of inflation uncertainty is by Friedman
(1977).
‘Inflation uncertainty also may affect markets other than the labor
market. For a discussion of its impact on product markets, see
Carlton (1982); on financialmarkets, seeKantor (1983), For abroad
overview, see Fischer(1982). Analternativeapproach to that used in
this paper would be to consider information a productive resource
and analyze the effects of a reduction in the level of this resource,
workers supply and the quantity that business firms
demand depend upon the real wage rate — the nomi-
nal wage i-ate adjusted for the level of prices. The in-
teraction of the supply and demand for- labor deter-
mines the equilibrium value of the realwage; the nomi-
nal wage adjusts upward or downward as inflation or’
deflation occurs. Figur-e 1 shows the labor market in
equilibr-ium at a real wage w~with employment Q~,
when the supply oflabor is5, and the demand forlabor
is D1. Ifthe nominal wage were completely flexible —
that is, if it adjusted instantly to keep the real wage
constant in the face of changing rates of inflation —
then unanticipated inflation would have no effect on
the labor market. Nominal wages simply would rise or
fall, maintaining equilibrium at w~and Q.
Nominal Wage Rigidity
Wages are not perfectly flexible, however, because of
contractual arrangements Lhat prevent their- immedi-
ate adjustment to changes in pr-ices. For example. in a
contract for union workers, the nominal wage is fixed
for a specified period of time. Although less than 25
percent of the U.S. labor force is unionized, the impact
of union wage contracts extends farbeyond this group.
If there is a threat of unionization, for example, the
wage increases won for- union laborers will affect the
wages that nonunionized firmsoffer their employees.”
‘Hamermeshand Rees (1984)discuss thearguments tor andagainst
the notion that the wages of nonunion workers emulate those of
union workers.
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In addition, there are many implicit agreements be-
tween employers and employees that keep nominal
wages fixed for a specified period.4 Oftentimes, both
employers and employees recognize that it would be
too costly for’nominal wages to adjust to everytempo-
rary deviation of actual events from the expected.
The contracted nominal wage is determined in
essentially the same manner- as in the flexible-wage
case, The only difference is that w in figure I is now
the equilibrium expected real wage — the nominal
wage adjusted forthe expected level ofprices — rather
than the equilibrium actual real wage.5
Ifnominal wages are rigid in the short i-un,the actual
differs from the expected real wage when there is un-
anticipated inflation. Iftheinflationary shock ispenna-
nent, then the nominal wage contract must ultimately
be renegotiated. Recontracting, however, will not
occur immediately unless the shock is of sufficient
magnitude (in absolute terms) for’ the gains from im-
mediate recontracting to exceed the costs. Otherwise,
an unanticipated shor-t-run redisti-ibution of wealth
occurs.
Furthermore, assuming a downward-sloping de-
4See Azariadis (1975) and Baily (1974).
assumethat both the suppliers and demanders of laborexpectthe
same rate of inflation to occur.
mand for labor curve and an upward-sloping supply of
labor curve, a deviation in either- directiori of actual
from anticipated inflation results in r-educed employ-
ment. This is illustrated in figure 2.With inflation high-
er than previously expected, the actual real wage is w,
which is less than the equilibrium expected i-calwage
w~.This results in a reduction of employment from
Q~ to Q and an excess demand for labor (Qj —
With lower-than-expected inflation, the actual real
wage is w3 which is greater than wi. This also results
in a reduction of employment (again drawn at 0., for
ease of exposition) but with excess supply of labor
(Q-, — Q). Notice that both the supply and demand
curves are more steeply sloped in figure 2 than in figure
I. This is because the elasticity of both supply and
demand with respect to theactual real wage should be
lessin absolute value for this short-run casethan it is in
the long run, because both workers and firms would
like to avoid immediate recontracting if possible.8
In reality, nominal wages have varying degrees of
flexibility because of differences in the characteristics
°Many theorists, including Gray (1976), Fischer (1 977a)and Katzand
Rosenberg (1983) use models in which nominal wages are deter-
mined by contract and business firms adiust employment in accor-
dance with the realized value of the real wage. Therefore, in these
models, employment is completelydemand-determined, andhigher-
than-expected inflation results in a higher level of employment be-
cause ofthe lower realwage. Fora critique ofthis type of model,see
Barro (1977).
Iuifirl tabor Market Equilibrium
Reel
Wore 5,
Qi- Quantity of labor
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ofwage contracts. Therefore, some conthination of the
flexible- and rigid-wage models describes actual labor
market behavior.
INITIAL EFFECTS OF GREATER
INFLATION UNCERTAINTY
Gr-eater-uncertainty about inflation increases the risk
of entering into wage contracts. There is a much
greater potential for error in forecasting inflation,
which increases the potential deviation of actual from
expected real wages. Under reasonable assumptions,
this increase in risk has the effect of i-educing employ-
ment and increasing the costs of negotiating a given
labor contract.
This analysis assumes that workers ar-c risk-averse,
business firms al-c risk-neutral and nominal wages are
fairly rigid.7 As the level of inflation uncertainly in-
creases, risk-averse workers reduce the supply of Labor’
offered to the market.5 They r-edir-ect their activities
‘The assumption ofrisk-averse workersand risk-neutralfirmsis used
frequently in the literature on labor contracting; see, for example,
Azariadis, One reason, as explained by Gordon (1974), is that it is
more difficultto reducetherisk associatedwith owninghuman capital
than physical capital. Forexample, people tend to be specialized in
their labor skills, whereas their other capital holdings tend to be
diversified.
°Amihud(1981) presents a model that leads to this result,
toward those that are affected less by unanticipated
inflation. Aside from opting for greater income from
more effectively hedged capital holdings, they devote
more time to leisul’e or to labor provided outside the
mar-ket — for’ example, labor exchanged directly (hr
goods and services or- labor for ones own benefit such
as home improvements. This is illustrated in figure 3by
a movement of the supply curve from 5, to S~.Because
the demand forlabor- by risk-neutr-aI business firms is
unaffected by gr-eater inflation uncertainty, the de-
ri~andcurve )D, ) r-emains stationary. Labor contracts
will be revised so that the equilibrium expected real
wage i-ate r-ises fr-nm tv~to w~and the equilibr-iurn
level of employment falls fi-om Q~ to O~,”Reduction of
emplownent ~vill also i-educe the level of i-cal output
and possibly increase the rate of unemployment.’0
Gr-eaterinflation uncertainty increases the complex-
ity of wage negotiations, because of the potential for
increased loss to both the employer and employee
from incorrectly choosing the nominal wage-
adjustment mechanism or contract duration. Ifwages
ar-cnot indexed, it becomes mor-e difficult to determine
the appropriate nominal wage changes to incol-porate
in the contract, Ifwages are indexed, there n-emairi the
problems ofchoosing the ‘‘best’ index to use for- nomi-
nal wage adjustments and the extent to which wages
will he adjusted for changes in the index. Other- poten-
tial consider’ations ar-c whether to set caps on the size
ofcost—of—liuing adjustments and the conditions under
which contract negotiations will he reopened befor-e
expiration of the contract. Thus, the costs of negotiat-
ing a labor contract increase with inflation un-
certainty. or
tlf both firms and workersare riskaverse, then employment fallseven
more, but the effect on the equilibrium real wage is indeterminate.
‘°Themeasured rate of unemployment may increase despite the
occurrence of equilibrium in the labor market, because of people
continuing tosearch forajob eventhough they’re unwilling to accept
one at the prevailing wage rate, Recent studies by Mullineaux
(1980), Levi and Makin (1980), Ratti (1983) and Amihud indicate
that greater inflation uncertainty reduces employment and output
growth and increases unemployment.
‘‘One indicator of the higher costs of negotiating labor contracts
wouldbean increase in strike activity, since the increased complex-
ity of negotiations makes it more difficult to reach a settlement,
Labor economists haveknown for manyyearsthat pastinflation has
asignificant positive impact on the incidenceof labor strikes. See,
for example, Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969). The standard ex-
planation is that this reflects catch-up demandson the part of labor
forinflationthey did not anticipate and, therefore, were notcompen-
sated for at the time of previous contract negotiations. Given the
evidencethat inflationuncertainty is positively related to past infla-
tion (see Holland), this finding is consistent with the notion that
greater inflation uncertainty leads to more strike activity.
Real
Wage
Q~~i Of Quantity of Oar
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Inflation uncertainty also makes it mnor-e difficult to
distinguish changes in the rate of inflation fi-om
changes in relative prices: an incr’ease in inflation un-
certainty r’educes the extent towhich aproducer-alters
his output in r-esponse to achange in the relative pr-ice
of his product.’4 The reason is that a producer will he
less likely to regard an unexpectedly higher’ pr-ice for’
his product as an incr-ease in its r-elative price. Instead,
he will regan-d it as a r-ellection of his own inability to
accurately pr-edict the i-ate ofinflation, In this way, the
allor:ative efficiency of the pr-ice system is reduced,
since labor’ and other resources will not necessar’ily be
directed toward their most productive uses.’3 All
things equral, if the mar-gmat pr-oduct of labor declines,
the demand for’ labor and the equilihr-iurm real wage
falls~.’l’hiswould imply an even gr-eater reduction in
employment than that illustrated in figure 3.
ADAPTING TO INFLATION
UNCERTAINTY
There are two basic ways to reduce the risk ofwage
contr-acting in an envir-onment of inflation uncertainty:
Ill shor-ten the dur-ation of contr’acts, thus lessening
the potential loss from an incorr-ect prediction of infla-
tion, or’ (21 index contr-acts, with wage adjustments
linked to changes in the price level, Each of these
adaptations will incn-ease the responsiveness of nomi-
n~lwages to an inflationary shock.
“Fora producerto increase output in the short run, hemust beableto
increase employment. This requireseither someflexibility ofnomin-
al wages or demand-determined employment in the short run,
“See Lucas (1973) and Friedman. The confusion between relative
and absolute price changes implies that the greater the inflation
uncertainty, the less the effects on the firm’s output, labor demand
and wages of an actual change in the relativedemand for its prod-
uct, Therefore, greaterinflationuncertainty reducesthe impactofan
increase in the variance of changes in relative productdemands on
the variance ofchanges in relative wages, assuming that nominal
wages are flexible. To the extent that changes in relative wages
assist in allocatinglabor in the most efficient manner, this indicatesa
potential loss ofefficiency. This may explain Hamermesh’s (1983)
finding that greater inflation uncertainty reduces the variance of
changes in relative wages in the United States.
Anotherway that inflation uncertainty may affectthe productivity
of labor arises because greater inflation uncertainty should be
associated with greater varianceovertimeof unanticipatedinflation.
Ifthe level of employment varies with short-term changes in the real
wage due to unanticipated inflation, then the variance of employ-
ment is positively associated with inflation uncertainty. Katz and
Rosenberg showthat, if thereare diminishing returns to the use of
labor input,then the productivity oflabor declines on average asthe
(mean-preserving) variance of employment gets higher. Therefore,
greater inflation uncertainty reduces labor productivity. (This result
holds even if the meanlevel of employment declines as a result of
the uncertainty.)
Ther-e is evidence that gr-eater inflation uncer-tainty
has served to r-edirce the dunation of labor contracts.
Using data fi’orn the urnionized sector of the Canadian
labor market for 1966—75, Christofides and Wilton
119831 find asignificant negative r-elationship between
inflation uricer-taintv and the length ofcontr-acts. ‘l’hus,
greater inflation uncertainty diverts more resources to
the contracting process fi-om other ipr-eviouslv mon-c
valuablel uses, riot only because negotiations an-c mon-c
complex, but also because negotiations occur more
fr-equeritlv.
Gm-eater inflation uncertainty also is associated with
more widespread indexatiorr of labor contracts, Chart
1 plots a measure of inflation uncertainty — the root-
mean-squared el-I-nt-)RMSEI of 12-month inflationfore-
casts fr’om the Livingston survey — and a measure of
the prevalence of indexation — the number ofworkers
coven-ed by cost—of-living adjustment ICOLAI clauses as
apetcentage ofthe total number of worker-s subject to
major collective bargaining agreements.’4 When
viewed over the last 20 year’s, inflation uncertainty
shows a rising trenid, although with substantial vari-
ability. Over the last 10 years, however-, the trend has
virtually disappear.ed,r5 Indexation mci-eased substan-
tially in the lOGOsand 1970s as well, before levelling off.
From 1967—77, COLA cover-age J-ose from about 25 per--
cent to its peak of over 60 pci-cent and has remained
fairly stable since then,
Simple correlations suggest that inflation uncer-tain—
ty has a lagged effect on the pr-evalence of indexation.
The correlation coefficients areriot significant between
COLA cover-age and RMSE iii the cun-r-ent or pre\Jous
~‘ear.The correlation of COLA coveragewith RMSEtwo
year’s before 10,441, however’, is significant at the 10
‘4Joseph Livingston of The Philadelphia Inquirer conducts a survey
each spring andfall requesting respondentsto indicate theirpredic-
tionsabouta numberofeconomic indicatorsincludingthe consumer
price index (CPI). Iuse only the year-end to year-end forecasts in
this article. The inflation forecasts are actually 14-month forecasts,
sincerespondents are thought to knowonlythe level ofthe October
CPI whenthey turn in their predictions in December of the level of
the CPI for the following December. With this in mind, Carlson
(1977) has revised Livingston’s data on inflation expectations, and
this revised data (updated through 1983) is used here, The useof
the mean-squared error of the forecasts as a measure of inflation
uncertainty is advocated by Cukierman and Wachtel (1982). The
dataon cost-of-living adjustments come fromvarious issues ofthe
Monthly Labor Review (see U.S. Department of Labor). Majorcol-
lective bargaining agreements are those that applyto 1,000ormore
workers. Although this is not a comprehensive indicator of the
incidence of COLAcoverage, it does cover the majority of all work-
ers covered by COLA provisions. See Sheifer (1979).
“Regressions of RMSE on atime trend for the periods 1964—83 and
1974—83 confirm this perception.
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Chart 1
Inflation Uncertainty and the Percentage of Workers Covered
by Cost-of--living Adjustment Clauses
percent level; for three years earlier 0511, it is signifi-
cant at the S percent level’5
Ther-e is evidence also that indexation offer-s an
alternative to shon’tening the dun-ation of contracts in
the face of gr-eater inflation uncertainty, Christofides
and Wilton find that the r-esponse of contr-act duration
to inflation uncertainty is less in indexed than in
nonindexed contr-acts,
Labor Market Adjustments and the
Real Effects of Inflation Uncertainty
Labor manket adjustments that lead to more flexible
nominal wages also should lead to a reduction in the
impact of inflation uncertainty on employment and
output gr-owth. In the extreme, if all wages could he
costlessly indexed to eliminate the risk ar-ising from
‘°Hendricksand Kahn (1983) also find a positive impact of inflation
uncertaintyon the probability that a givenwage contract is indexed,
unanticipated inflation, inflation uncertainty would
have rio impact on the supply of labor.5’ However-, the
prohlems of imperfect price level nieasur-es and delays
iii the availability of pr’iceleveldata make perfect index—
ation impossible.58 Ther’e ar-c also costs of pr-oviding
gr-eater- indexation, one of which is described in the
next section.
F’igur’e 3 shows what happens in the labor- mar-ket as
these adjustments occur’. The initial effect of gr-eater
inflation uncer-taintv was ifiustr’ated by the movement
of the labor- supply curve fi’om Sr to 5,- As measures to
reduce the risk associated with inflation uncer’taintv
are taken, the supply curve shifts back to the right — to
S.,, for instance. ‘l’his second—r-ound effect of inflation
uncer-tainty moves employment and the expected I-cal
wage back towar-d their’ original levels — to O~and
“See Amihud,
‘8See Alchian and Klein (1973) for a discussion of the technical
problems associated with price indexes.
19646566616869707172737475761118198081&2831984
NOTE, Inflation uncertainly is measured as rhe root.meon-squored error of 12-month, year-end inflation forecasts
from the Livingston survey. The percentage ol workers covered by COLA clauses applies to workers under
maior collective bargaining agreements 11,000 or more workersl.
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w. Because indexation is imperfect, the supply curve
does not shift all the way back to itsoriginal position at
5,, so then-c remains a net reduction of employment.
Because less market output is pn’oduced with lower’
employment even though the same level of pr’oductive
r-esouices is available to the economy. Ihis represents a
net loss from inflation uncertainty,
EFFECTS OF INCREASED
RESPONSIVENESS OF WAGES TO
INFLATIONARY SHOCKS
The pn-eceding section showed that labor mar-kets
adapt to gi-eater inflation uncer-tainty in ways that in-
crease the r-esponsiveness of nominal wages to an
inflationary shock, ‘l’his type of labor mat-ket adjust-
rllent has consequences on the economy beyond those
illustr-ated above, arid the ini’rplications differ-depend-
ing on the soun-ce of the inflationary shock,
Nominal Shocks
Inì the face of a pun-ely nominal shock, such as an
unanticipated change in nominal aggr-egate demand
pi-oduced by an unexpected change in the mone’ sup-
ply, the greater- responsiveness of noriiinal wages in-
creases the stability of output growth and uniem-
plovment: consequently, for’ nominal shocks, indexing
impn-oves the efficiency of the labor- market. Ifnominal
wagesadjust slowly andifthe gr-owthn-ate ofthenioney
supply is reduced. the result is an eventual increase in
real wages when the inflation rate falls, This occurs
even if wor-ken’s arid firms anticipate the change in
monetary policy as long as sonic of 111cm an-c still coy-
er’ed by labor’ contr-acts negotiated befor-e this expecta—
‘91t should be emphasizedthat this is a partial equilibrium analysis;
interaction between the labor market and other markets is not
considered, In particular, the results concerning the impactof infla-
tion uncertainty on employment and wages could be altered if, for
example,greater inflation uncertainty causeda reduction in invest-
ment and a lower capital-labor ratio for the economy.
Furlhermore,the analysis hasnot dealt with all ofthe implications
of costly indexing. Under the assumptionsof the analysis, it is the
risk-averse workerswho desire indexing, and the risk-neutral firms
must be paid to provide it. since it is costly. At the margin, the value
of a higherdegree of indexing to the workers (theamount they are
willing to pay) equalsthe costofindexing to thefirm, If, however, the
marginal cost of indexing is constant while its marginal value is
declining, then the firm profits from providing a higher degree of
indexing. In other words, in the presence of higher risk, the risk-
neutral firm profits from the riskaversionof itsworkers, This implies
a higher demand for labor as the degree of indexation increases,
though this effect should not be largeenough to altertheconclusion
that greater inflation uncertainty leads to reduced employment.
tioni was for-med,’°Assuming that contm’acts are not
renegotiated prior- no their expiration, the quantity of
labor demanded by business fir-mswill be r-educed and
the quantity supplied by won-ken-s will be inr~r’~~~’1se(l.
This was illustrated hi figure 2 as an increase in the
n-cal wage from w to w:rand an excess supply of labor
lQ, — Q). The excess supply of labor results in an
increase in the rate of unemployment, arid the decline
in the quantity oflabor- demanded causes a n’eductioni
in’s the gr-owth n-ale of real output. If, however, noniinal
wage growth adjusts downwar-d more quickly in r’e-
sponse to the conitn’actionary nionietary policy because
of indexation, for examplel, the impact on both the
quantity of labor demanded and supplied is n-educed,
Real Shocks
Ifthe inflationan-v shock is due to a i-cal distun-bance,
indexation makes it mon-c difficult for- the economy to
adjust to the shock. ‘l’his is because automatic cost-
of-living adjn.rstments pr-event at least tempon-ar-ilvi the
changes in n-cal wages that are requmr-ed in the face of
real shocks to the econoniy. This is an impor-tanl cost
of ir’rdexing. For example~asubstantial incn’ease in the
n-dative pr-ice of ener~’ leads tohigher- pr-icesin gener-al
because of ener~v’srole as a factor- of pr’oduction for
manygoods. Because the costs of production incr’ease,
pn-oducer’s ar-cwilling to supply less at any given price
than they were befone the shock. Asaconsequence, the
denianid for labor- falls as well, thereby lower’irrg the
equihbr’ium r’eal wage.’’
In figur-e 4, the reduction in’s the demand for- labor
fn-om U, to U, results in a reduction in the equilibn-ium
n-cal wage fini lvi to w~.As the price level incr-eases
due to the ener~’shock, the indexation of wages cx-
acerhates the effect of the shock by preventing the
needed decline in the n-cal wage and causing excess
supply of labor of the aniount QT — Q,l. In the ab-
senice of indexation, however-, nominal wages need not
rise in proportion to the rise in prices, and the real
wage can decline to its equilibrium level, w& with
the employment level at O~.‘thus, the impact of the
ener~’shock on the economy is reduced.”
In the event of a positive n-cal shock — one that
results in an incr-ease in output and the demand for
‘°SeeFischer (1977b).
“The discussionassumes that laborand energyare complementary
inputs, at least in the short-run — the period forwhich this analysis
applies.
“See Gordon (1984)fora simple model ofthe effectsofanaggregate
supply shock on the economy.
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market and i-educes the welfare of society. The major
effect on the labor mar-ket of greater- inflation uncer-
tainty is reduced efficiency in allocating labor re-
soun-ces. The end result is n-educed employment and
output growth, higher-unemployment and nnor-e com-
plex wage contr-act negotiations.
The labor market has adapted to greater- inflation
n.rncer-taint’v by n-educing the dur-ation of labor’ con-
tracts and incr-easing the prevalence ofindexation, Asa
result, nominal wages have exhibited agr-eater n-espon-
siveness to inflationary shocks. The consequences of
these events on the economy include reductions in
both the shon’t-r-un impact of monetany policy on out-
put and the ability of the economy to adjust to a n-cal
supply shock such as an enier-~’crisisl. Labor mar-ket
adaptations reduce but do not completely offset the
impact of a given level of inflation uncer-tainty on the
econ’iomy.
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